The Battle of Soui Tre (LZ Gold)-Joe B.

The Battle of Soui Tre took place March 18 and 19, 1967. At the time I was the Commanding Officer (CO) of the 118^th Attack Helicopter Company (AHC). The company was a part of the 145^th Combat Aviation Battalion. For this operation out battalion was augmented with the 335^th AHC on March 18 and the 68^th AHC on March 18^th.

Saturday, March 18, 1967

On the above date the 145^th Combat Aviation Battalion had the mission to insert an Infantry unit into a landing zone (LZ) in War Zone C. The operation was staged from a pickup zone (PZ) located on the edge of Ap Trai Dan. The Infantry unit’s mission, with a direct support artillery unit, was to establish a fire base om the location of the LZ. The original plan called for an Armored Cavalry unit to go out and secure the LZ. Once secured the 145^th Cbt Avn Bn was to airlift the Infantry unit from the PZ to the LZ. I believe it was to require six or seven lifts. En route to secure the LZ the Armored Cav unit was ambushed and stopped. Their efforts during the day were unsuccessful and they failed to complete their mission.

There were two Assault Helicopter companies participating in this battalion operation - the 118^th AHC under my command and the 335^th AHC, a company on loan to the 145^th from the 173^rd Airborne Brigade. The 335^th was assigned as the direct support aviation company.

Around mid-afternoon a standard combat assault operation was considered but rejected. After waiting all day, the 145^th mission was cancelled and the AHC’s were released to return to their respective home bases. The mission would be continued on March 19^th.

Sunday (Palm Sunday), March 19, 1967

On this date the 145^th Cbt Avn Bn had the mission to return and complete the mission from the previous day. This time it would be a combat assault insertion of the Infantry unit. The operation was again staged from the PZ on the edge of ApTrai Dan. The 118^th AHC was a participating unit. The 68^th AHC replaced the 335^th AHC on Sunday. Our final briefings on the operation were conducted at the PZ. The 68^th AHC was designated the lead company for the operation. The final briefing provided several facts - War Zone C had a limited number of LZ’s that could handle a battalion sized combat assault; no preparatory fires were planned; and our formation would have ten aircraft in each company. There would be a two-minute separation between the two companies.

The operation began around 0900. The 68^th made its approach into the LZ, disembarked their troops; took off and reported the LZ “COLD”. It was a surprise and some relief to hear that transmission. The 118^th made its approach to the LZ. The troops disembarked and I was just starting my takeoff when there was a horrendous explosion behind me. Radios became alive and reported that three aircraft near the middle of our formation had been damaged and were burning. The 118^th aircraft managed to fly out of the LZ. One aircraft from the 118th reported control problems and had to quickly land just a short distance away from the LZ. A Bandit Gun Team put protective cap on them until help could arrive. Five aircraft got back to the LZ, still in flyable condition. A sixth aircraft got back to the PZ a little bit late despite moderate damage. It could not be used when the mission continued. At this point the 118^th had only five operational aircraft.

The operation was temporarily stopped to assess the situation. In a span of a few minutes the operation was resumed. The troops on the ground from the first lift would secure an area in the LZ to accommodate flights of five aircraft.

In the second lift, the two flights of five ahead of me in the 68^th went in and out with no problems. As directed, I came to a hover and the troops jumped out. Before I could start my takeoff, there was a strong explosion in front of my helicopter. Everything went black and the XO and I were both struck by debris The explosion blew out the chin bubbles, part of the windshield and bent the front doors. We had to exit the aircraft through the cargo doors. The major explosion to the 118^th’s formation in the first lift was a rigged unexploded 250-pound bomb.

It was an assault that could have had fewer difficulties for our unit, but it was successful.

A Place Called My Phuoc Tay

Posted for Jim M.

This piece begins with extracts of letters that I wrote home from Vietnam, and continues with my recollections over 30 years later.

7 April 1970

Here we are, right in the middle of beautiful Nowhere. When I say nowhere, I mean it. We are about 30 kilometers due north of Vinh Long in one of those places where the only access is by helicopter or boat. Our CP is in a bombed out village that once was quite a place, but that now looks like something out of a World War II movie.

This place is a testimony to the turbulence which existed in VN politics after the Diem government was toppled. This was one of a series of “Agrivilles” build by Diem. These were planned agricultural and market complexes that were placed at different places all over the country. During the series of coups beginning in ’63, GVN could no longer maintain troops here and this one was abandoned. The people moved out, VC moved in, and the place was pretty well shot up in the subsequent seesaw battles. A few months ago, GVN moved back in strength for the first time since ’65. They have some outposts around and the area is being farmed again, but the VC haven’t given up yet. We haven’t found any since we’ve been here, though.

11 April 1970

I started a letter yesterday by saying that it was starting out as a quiet day—nothing happening. I don’t think that I’ll make that mistake again. Right after the first paragraph, things got a bit busier and didn’t let up until about midnight. A couple of our battalions made contact with several companies of VC and the resulting activity kept us going for a while. Everything worked out all right, but was hectic for a while.

13 April 1970

The past three days have been somewhat hectic. I think that I told you that we finally made contact with a VC/NVA unit after days of beating the paddies with no results. A couple of our battalions fought a hard battle with them on Friday, the VC broke contact late at night, and then we found them again on Saturday. We took a number of casualties, but prisoners, documents, etc, now indicate that we had met the 261A VC BN and dealt them a severe blow. The troops found a number of bodies and equipment, and captured the battalion colors. Indications are that many were killed, including the BN C.O., and X.O., and that the battalion is no longer an effective fighting force. This was an especially important victory since this battalion had recently attacked one of the VN firebases and really wreaked havoc.

May 8, 2007

These comments should serve to fill in some gaps in my earlier remarks about the events of 10 April 1970 near the garden spot of My Phuoc Tay. I was in the air over the fight, and, as I said in the letter of the 11^th, it was hectic for a while. My problems were nothing like those of the people on the ground, however.

My boss, who I shall only refer to as Col O, had started off the day flying backseat in the command and control ship that inserted at least one of the battalions of the two that were in the fight. He and I normally swapped off every day unless we received an air cavalry package. Col O had decided that I should fly those since I was armor. Coincidentally, that decision came right after he flew his first mission with them and found that their C&C ships routinely flew quite low.

Sometime in the afternoon, he landed and had me go up, pleading a splitting headache. I’m sure that was true, but it was never easy to pick up a mission in the middle. Fortunately, I had been following the action on the radio, and was pretty well up to speed. As the day progressed, we started getting more and more air support. Just before dark we had a dual problem—we had almost more support than we could use and the VNAF pilot in the front seat of the C&C that I was in was insisting that he had to leave.

The latter problem with the pilot stemmed from the fact that VNAF UH1 pilots were generally cleared for only VFR, i.e., no night flying. I’m not sure how we did it, but my counterpart, LTC Chinn, the regimental commander, and I managed to badger him into continuing to fly well after dark.

The problem with the support was that it all arrived at once. At one time, we had a USAF Forward Air Controller with several sorties of fast movers, a VNAF Spooky gunship (AC-47), a USAF Shadow gunship (AC-119), and a flight of USN Black Ponies (OV-10A Bronco). In addition to that bunch, there were the normal Cobra gunships supporting the lift, and field artillery support from the ARVN.

An immediate problem with all of that stuff flying was the control of airspace, and making sure that everyone understood where the friendly troops were on the ground. As darkness fell, both problems were exacerbated. All of the air guys were on my FM radio frequency, so I made a general announcement that I was the guy in charge in the air, and the American advisor (Captain Bob Redman) was in charge on the ground. In the event of conflict, his instructions were trump.

To sort out airspace, I designated a fire that was burning on the ground and said to all that the fire represented the center of a clock. I then assigned quadrants of the clock to the primary actors, telling them to go out about 10 kilometers and loiter until I called them in. Once they got out there, I asked for a report of who had the least time remaining on station, and called them in first. Once they had expended their ordnance, the next group went in, and so on. The trickiest part of this kind of an action is to make sure that you don’t hit your own troops, and calls for close coordination between the folks on the ground and those in the air. Transmissions have to be clear and precise, with all parties concerned agreeing on where the fire is to be placed.

I had a problem in this regard with the Navy OV-10s. The quality of their support was, as was customary, super, but getting agreement on the target location was daunting. The OV-10A was an absolutely superb aircraft for close support of ground troops. They could fly slow enough and long enough that they had no need for a FAC as the fast movers did.

The target identification procedure that we used in this case was for me to give them a location, and one plane would attack the spot with 7.62 mm machine gun tracers. Once all concerned agreed on the location, they attacked with their 20 mm guns and 5 inch rockets. They could indeed do a job on a ground target, and we always loved to have them flying for us.

The problem this night was that every time the Black Pony attacked, my VNAF pilot would bank. They made at least 2 runs that I couldn’t observe. Finally, I told them that I would be off the air while they made another run. Because the cord was so short, I had to disconnect from the radio in order to hang over the edge of the Huey to watch where they fired. That was no mean feat for someone who dislikes heights as much as I do. Using this unconventional technique, I was able to observe, and then get back on the radio to clear them for attack.

As I recall, the rest of the attacks from the air went well. One of the real potent weapons types in that area with little air defense was the Spooky/Shadow gunships. These were transport planes with 6,000 round-per-minute miniguns mounted, and with a capability to drop flares for illumination. They could stay on station for hours.

I have already said in my quote from my letters that we carried the day, but, of course, it was not without cost. Captain Bob Redman, whom I mentioned above, was wounded during the course of the fight, along with quite a few ARVN infantrymen. Because of the heavy fire and the terrain, we were unable to get a medevac helicopter in to pull out the wounded. The division senior advisor radioed Bob to tell him that he would come in with his C&C ship and pull him out. Bob refused, unless they could also evacuate the VN wounded. For this and other reasons, I submitted Bob for a Silver Star, the only time I did that in a year. (Awards for valor were hard to come by in MACV, at least in IV Corps.) Thirty plus years later I made contact with him and found out that he got the award. It was well earned, and I am glad to finally close that loop.

Traffic Citation

Thanks, Frank G.

Frank was the commander of a helicopter unit that supported the combat troops in Viet Nam. Among the helicopters in the unit were the Chinooks. They are the large banana shaped birds with rotors on both ends of the aircraft. They are used to transport troops, equipment and ammunition.

Now for the story:

Frank was in his office one day when a couple of MP's (Military Police) came in. They wanted to know who the pilot was of a Chinook flying over a specific site at a specific time. That probably wouldn't be too difficult to discern, if one had the time. Prior to expending the time and energy, Frank wanted to know what the story was.

The MP's said that a Chinook had blown over one of their 3/4 ton trucks with its rotor blast at that site and time. Because there was a "traffic" accident they had to issue a citation to the pilot for his part in it. Say what? Frank told them it would be nearly impossible to find the pilot. Since he was the commander, they should just issue the citation in his name and he would take care of it. The MP's did and left. The MP's hadn't cleared the are and Frank was in the air. He flew to the location of the Provost Marshal (PM) who had the responsibility for the area and the MP's.

He and the PM had a good working relationship. He asked Frank, "What was up?" Frank told him and asked him if he could fix it. The PM said no problem. It was news to him that a Chinook had such power. They both laughed heartily and agreed that there was no way such a thing could happen.

A few days later, Frank got a call from the PM. Apparently, the MP's had a vehicle accident through their own misdeeds and were trying to get out of trouble. The PM took appropriate action and Frank's dubious citation disappeared.

Christmas 1971, Saigon, RVN.

I was working as a Narcotic Staff Officer in the Provost Marshal’s office at MACV Headquarters in Saigon. There were about ten of us assigned to the office and that included Vietnamese clerical folks. In an effort to maintain some semblance of normalcy we agreed to enter into a Secret Santa gift swap.

It was a nice way to celebrate the season with our friends and compatriots. For the life of me, I cannot remember whose name I got or what I purchased for that person. I do know what someone got for me.

It is a simple hand carved wooden statuette made in Thailand. It represents Madonna and Child. I have no idea who thought that I would like such a gift. For that very reason, I treasure it. If memory serves me right, we had a very low dollar limit on such gifts, so it was the thought that counted. That, along with the simple beauty of the statuette and the season give added meaning for me. It has a place of honor in our bedroom.

Vietnamese IED

Posted for R. O.

During the summer of 1968, I was a member of a Mobile Advisory Team assigned to Thoung Duc District in Quang Nam Province, I Corps RVN.
We were responsible for working with the Regional Force and Popular Force units in the district as part of the effort to “Vietnamize” the war. While the district was geographically large the population was small and the was only one RF company and 10 PF platoons. All units lived in the only town in the district of the same name. The most interesting feature of the town was a large European style Catholic church in the middle of the ville.

The other interesting demographic was that the Catholics there were nearly all North Vietnamese, either those who had fled the north in 1954 or their descendants.
The total US advisor population was a small district team of three officers and two enlisted plus the MAT (two officers and three NCOs).

The town was isolated from friendly territory and the only way in or out for any one was by helicopter or Caribou. We did have another semi-friendly adjacent element in the area, as the An Duc SF camp adjoined the district compound on one side. The other major force in the area was the 2nd NVA division which occupied most of the district to our west to the Laos border.

Part of the district team was the captain responsible or the Phoenix program. He had a pot of money to do various things and one of those things was to pay the locals of weapons/ammuntion turned, no questions asked. At times we would accumulate a small cache of B40 rockets, 82mm mortar rounds and NVA hand grenades and other miscellaneous stuff before the District Senior Advisor (also a CPT) would get pissed and make the Phoenix CPT haul the stuff up to the SF demo pit and blow it up.
The town and the district compound were on a ridge nestled in the Y of the junction of two good sized rivers. Just across a bridge at the smaller river, we had a small air strip where the Air Force periodically brought supplies for both us and the Vietnamese via Caribou.

One day we were at the bridge replenishing our water supply, when the Phoenix CPT and a small group of boys ages 8-12 approached. A couple of the boys had what looked to be a metal canister about one foot square on the end and about 30 inches long slung on a pole between them. That sort of container normally was filled with nuoc mam, that wonderful aromatic fermented fish stuff the Vietnamese loved. According to the Captain, it was some sort of bomb/explosive device and he wanted us to take it back to the compound so he could study it.

So being the dumb-ass Lt that I was at the time, I complied with my instructions from a senior officer and we loaded the thing on the 2 ½ ton truck and drove back to the compound. It probably weighted about 35-40 lbs. Once there we place the device in the normal spot of the captain’s other toys (next to the shitter), and headed back to the river of another load of water.

Well shortly after we reached the river there was a loud explosion on the compound from the area where we had put the device. We rushed back to the compound to assess the damage. Fortunately, it was siesta time and no one had been wandering around the compound. While there was a fair amount of damage to the latrine and one adjacent building, there was only one casualty, a Vietnamese 1LT who had his room in that area and the wall fell on him as he rested. We got a Medevac, but he didn’t make it.

It is interesting to speculate if the device had a time fuse or was command detonated. If it had a time fuse, which would seem unlikely, unless the bomb was intended to have a random effect, I was both stupid and lucky as it could have gone off while I was in the close proximity.

Now if it was a command detonated device, it would have been relatively easy for the NVA to maintain observation as there were high ridge lines on the far sides of each river. Was the Captain specifically targeted? He was known for buying up stray munitions and things and taking the stuff back to the compound. He was also known for his tinkering with some of the more primitive items. This all could have been observed over time. I have never heard of such a device being used in Vietnam by the NVA, but I don’t thing it was beyond their capability.

Anyway that is my story of a Vietnam IED

Mid-air Collision

Posted for J. M.

One of my most vivid memories of my tour in Vietnam was a mid-air collision between two helicopters – an American Cobra gunship and a Vietnamese UH-1H on May 2, 1970. As an advisor to the Vietnamese, I had been spared the pain of seeing Americans die, and for all these years later, I often thought of the two men on that Cobra. As I got ready to visit the Moving Wall in Lenexa, I realized that I did not know the names of the men.

After a search of the web, I discovered the names of the two crewmembers. They were WO Donald Parker and 1st Lt. Frank Rice. I looked them up on the Virtual Wall website and posted the following on each man’s page:

Jim M
Witness to the midair collision.

We saw it happen
On 1 May 1970, I was an Army Major serving as senior advisor to a Vietnamese armored cavalry squadron, and our incursion into Cambodia began. On that day, my senior NCO advisor looked at everything that was flying and said "Somebody had better get a handle on all this stuff, or we are going to have a midair." The next day it happened - a Cobra clipped the tail boom of a Huey right in our area. The Cobra crew never had a chance. Tonight for the first time I discovered who the crew members were - 1st Lt Frank Rice and WO Donald Parker. This week the Moving Wall comes here, and I will pay my respects to them. May you rest in peace, Heroes.
Sep 10, 2007


On September 14, I received this email:


Mr Mathison --

This evening, i came across your message Frank Rice was my husband.

Would you please tell me exactly, honestly, what happened on 2 may I am presuming that since you have posted this message with your address, that you will not mind my inquiring.

I trust so

Some twenty-five years ago or so, a dear friend, tom griffin, (now retired as ltg) did some investigating for me in doing that, he talked with Col Ted Mathison, who was flying with the team that day. Col Mathison, graciously and generously, asked if he could meet me.

So Tom arranged that in his office.

Apparently the south vietnamese general's helicopter flew into the path of the cobras.

I have read one incident report.

Your view was from the ground up, what did you see?

I seldom look at these sites -- for several reasons. The only one i always see is the one posted by our daughter on vvmf.org -- it is my home page
but tonight, I was looking for information on the reading of names in November -- she and my grandchildren are reading his name and while doing this, I looked at the different sites.

I was stunned when I saw your entry.

C M Rice

By coincidence, one of the men who was with me on the ground also lives in Leavenworth and I called him to confirm some details. After that conversation, I composed the following response to Mrs. Rice:

Dear Mrs. Rice,

I know that my message on the website has reopened your wounds, and for that I am sincerely sorry. I am sure that Frank can never be very far from your thoughts, but you did not need any reminders of that tragic day.

First, let me say that my first view of the accident was a second or so after the impact between the two aircraft. Two people who worked for me did, however, see the whole thing, and they related what happened to me. I have just called one of the two men who were with the unit that was being supported, and he reminded me of a few details that I had not remembered.

This was our second day into a place called “the Parrot’s Beak”, on the border between Vietnam and Cambodia. The area that we were attacking was a heavily fortified logistics complex, and we were using every asset that we had available to dislodge the VC who were defending it. Because it was such a critical fight, the Vietnamese IV Corps Commander was on the scene in his helicopter, a UH-1H “Huey”, flown by a Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) crew. We were notified that a flight of 4 Cobras was in the area and available to attack the bunker complex where the heaviest fighting was.

Our troops marked the location of the enemy, and the Cobras started their attack runs. One or more of the ships completed their attacks without incident, and it came the turn of Frank and Mr. Parker to attack. They completed their run and, as they were pulling up, their main rotor hit the tail boom of the VNAF ship. Frank’s Cobra lost its main rotor, and they had no chance to survive. The VNAF ship came down spinning, but under reasonable control until moments before it impacted with the ground. Witnesses agreed that the pilot lost it at the last moment, and the helicopter plummeted to the ground, killing all aboard except for the crew chief.

Our 2-2 Troop dispatched a platoon of 3 armored personnel carriers, including one of my advisory team members, to render any aid possible and secure the site. It was this group that recovered the crew chief and reported that there were no more survivors.

It was apparent even to us non-rated soldiers that Frank and Mr. Parker were in the right, and that the IV Corps Commander’s Huey was down at a level where it did not belong. My first assignment in Vietnam was seven months with a Vietnamese infantry unit, and I flew on combat missions almost daily. I came to understand that there were rules and conventions within the aviation community regarding which levels aircraft should fly. The gun ships had to be allotted enough space to do their jobs, and the command and control ships were to stay out of their space.

Now, may I tell you how this all started, and how I came to post my message on the Virtual Wall website? My older son lives in the Kansas City area, and called to invite me to go with him to visit the Moving Wall this weekend. Although I have been to the Wall in Washington, I have never visited the Moving Wall. It seemed to be important to my son that we go, so I agreed to do so. I began to take stock of who, in particular, I wanted to pay my respects to. I graduated from West Point in 1961, and my first thoughts were of my 12 classmates who died in the war. Some of them were good friends and all were young. I remembered a fellow advisor, a captain who was killed on May 3, and I found his full name and his location on the Wall. Then I recalled that horrible moment of May 2, and realized that I did not know the names of the crew of the American helicopter.

After a lot of research, I found the names – Frank and Mr. Parker – and the accident report. In the course of reading the report, I learned that a Lieutenant Colonel Mathison was in the air over our area. That the only two field grade officers on the scene, this LTC and myself, shared a fairly uncommon last name was a remarkable coincidence. I located the other Mathison in Maryland, and I called him. He remembers that day like it was yesterday, and told me of meeting you when he was stationed in the Pentagon.

So, there you have it. I don’t believe that I have left anything out. I may have said more than you wanted, but I leave that to you to decide. When I go to the Moving Wall tomorrow, I will visit Frank and the others, and remember you and your daughter.

God Bless You,

Jim Mathison

Today, I received this response from her:

Thank you, Col Mathison.
Thank you

Most sincerely,
C M Rice


I received an envelope from Mrs. Rice, containing pictures, newspaper articles, and a letter. In the letter, she apologized for bothering me. I answered with the following email:

Dear Mrs. Rice,

On the contrary, I did not have the thoughts that you supposed. I very much enjoyed looking at the pictures, and reading the articles. You do have a handsome family.

Perhaps you would be interested in knowing a little more of what was behind my posting what I did on the Virtual Wall. I was influenced by the work of a young lady named Tracy Tragos, who is about the age of your daughter, and who also lost her father in Vietnam. Tracy's mother had never been very forthcoming about her dad, so she set out to learn about him. She told the story in the PBS show "Be Good, Smile Pretty." Perhaps you saw it. If not, I recommend it, although it is not easy to watch. The show was first telecast in 2003, but there are still articles and links at http://www.orphansofwar.org/.

I resolved to try to share anything that I knew if the opportunity ever presented itself. Once again, I hope that, in some small way, our correspondence has helped.

Jim Mathison